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INTRODUCTION

The year is 1938 and New Jersey residents have just turned on their
radios to hear Herbert George (“H.G.”) Wells broadcast fake news bulletins
that warn of an alien invasion.1 What the listeners do not seem to realize is
that Wells is performing a radio adaptation of his science-fiction novel, The
War of the Worlds.2 What results is nationwide hysteria that causes a flurry of
phone calls from anxious listeners to police stations, newspaper offices, and
other radio stations with fears of an imminent Martian maraud—a predictable
result of a population believing without seeing.3 Fast forward to the 21st
century, and now, even seeing is no longer believing; citizens can no longer

* Sergio E. Molina is a commercial litigator in Miami, Florida. Sergio obtained his Juris Doctor
from Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law with the College's
concentration in Intellectual Property, Technology, and Cybersecurity Law, and his bachelor’s
degree in finance with minors in economics and psychology from Florida International
University.
1.
A. Brad Schwartz, The Infamous “War of the Worlds” Radio Broadcast
Was
a
Magnificent
Fluke,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.
(May
6,
2015),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/infamous-war-worlds-radio-broadcast-wasmagnificent-fluke-180955180/.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
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trust their own eyes or ears.4 Claims such as these have moved out of the realm
of fake radio bulletins, hyperboles, or even hypotheticals and into what is now
our new, technologically-advanced reality.5 To what do citizens of today’s
society owe this belief in absolute disbelief?6 Enter “deepfakes,” a term that
combines the phrases “deep learning” and “fake,” that refers to a wide variety
of hyper-realistic images, videos, and audio recordings that are fabricated
through the use of machine learning.7
Deepfakes are synthetic audiovisual (“AV”) media with seemingly
limitless applications—a type of media that can do everything from the
recreation of voices to the swapping of faces from one person onto another.8
Below is a compilation of images that depict the manner in which deepfake
technology employs face-swapping methodology to create synthesized media
of Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren.9

Deepfake Media of Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren10
4.
See Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn't Believing,
CATH. U. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2018, at 51, 51.
5.
See Nicholas Diakopoulos & Deborah Johnson, Anticipating and
Addressing the Ethical Implications of Deepfakes in the Context of Elections, 23 NEW MEDIA
& SOC’Y 2072, 2073 (2021).
6.
See id.
7.
Id.; Elizabeth Caldera, Comment, “Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and
Ears”: Deepfakes and the Law of Virtual Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 178 (2019);
BRITT PARIS & JOAN DONOVAN, DATA & SOC’Y, DEEPFAKES AND CHEAP FAKES: THE
MANIPULATION
OF
AUDIO
AND
VISUAL
EVIDENCE
2
(2019),
http://datasociety.net/library/deepfakes-and-cheap-fakes/.
8.
PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 2; Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note
5, at 2073.
9.
See Will Knight, Facebook, Google, Twitter Aren’t Prepared for
Presidential
Deepfakes,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Aug
6,
2019),
http://www.technologyreview.com/2019/08/06/639/facebook-google-twitter-arent-preparedfor-presidential-deepfakes/. Visual aids are used throughout this Article to assist the reader in
seeing the effectiveness of some of the deepfake media currently available to the public.
Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1709 (2014) (“On the
rare occasions where journals did include images, they were startlingly effective.”).
10.
Knight, supra note 9.
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With deepfakes already spreading throughout various facets of
society, the strongest embrace is most notable from both the arts and
entertainment fields.11 Given deepfakes’ ability to superimpose the faces of
actors onto the bodies of stunt doubles or even to simulate actors’ scenes
altogether, it is no surprise that Hollywood has taken notice of the vast
opportunities that the new technology presents.12 But, it does not stop there.13
The realms of art and entertainment have seen the uses of deepfakes taken as
far as to bring long-deceased actors or public figures “back to life.”14
Although deepfakes present numerous benefits to the creative arts,
they also introduce a concerning reality.15 As the number of online deepfakes
grows by the day, many have questioned the harmful implications of the
technology and the effects that it may have when compounded by current
social and political climates.16 However, the potential for harm is not
exclusively reserved for public figures, nor is it reduced only to simplified
forms of AV manipulation.17 As society continues to see the democratization
of more advanced technologies, deepfakes have begun to present individuals
with novel methods of “exploitation, intimidation, and sabotage.”18 The most
concerning example of this has perhaps been the widespread use of deepfake
technology to fabricate pornography with the images of both public figures
and private individuals without their consent.19 This is just the tip of the
iceberg.20 Data suggests that minority communities, particularly women, are

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2073.
See id. at 2074; Hall, supra note 4, at 57.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2073.
Id.
See Marcus Baram, How Deepfakes Evolved So Rapidly in Just a Few
Years, FAST CO. (Oct. 8, 2019), http://www.fastcompany.com/90414479/how-deepfakesevolved-so-rapidly-in-just-a-few-years; Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2072; Bobby
Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and
National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2019).
16.
Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2072; PARIS & DONOVAN, supra
note 7, at 3.
17.
Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2080; PARIS & DONOVAN, supra
note 7, at 5–6.
18.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 15, at 1754.
19.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-379SP, SCIENCE & TECH
SPOTLIGHT:
DEEPFAKES 1 (2020), http://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-379sp.pdf; Mika
Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT.
REV., Nov. 2019, at 39, 43.
20.
See Robert Size, Publishing Fake News for Profit Should Be Prosecuted as
Wire Fraud, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 30–31 (2020).

254

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

more greatly affected by the harms that deepfake technologies present.21 It is
likely that minority communities with a greater stake in information and
personal privacy, like the LGBTQ+ community, could stand to lose more in
the wake of misused deepfake technology.22
While some believe that the discussions surrounding deepfakes’
potential threats are overstated, it can hardly be denied that technology is better
today than it was yesterday, and yet still not as good as it will be tomorrow.23
This is a dynamic that necessitates a discussion on the law’s evolution in order
to effectively address technological advancements and the harms that they
may impose.24 In that regard, deepfakes do not provide an exception to this
claim, but instead serve to reinforce its validity.25
This Article serves to address the current landscape of deepfake
technology in modern culture and its impacts on marginalized communities,
particularly the LGBTQ+ community, in four subsequent parts.26 Part II offers
a technical glimpse into the creation of deepfakes; how deepfakes came into
being and why deepfakes circulate society with great frequency.27 Part III
looks at the threats that deepfake technology can pose when put in the hands
of individuals seeking to harm or extort members of marginalized
communities, such as the LGBTQ+ community, by providing a historical
overview of similar forms of exploitation that the LGBTQ+ community has
faced in the past.28 Part IV explores the existing regulatory frameworks that
serve to address the harms of deepfake technology along with the suggested
evolutions and amendments of those frameworks.29 This Article concludes by
21.
Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay:
Deep Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. L.
REV. 882, 886 (2019); Baram, supra note 15; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note
19, at 1.
22.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 886; Baram, supra note 15; Sergio
E. Molina, DL and Looking? So Are the Data Miners, and They Already Know What You’re
Into, OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, Fall/Winter 2019, at 4–5.
23.
Russell Brandom, Deepfake Propaganda Is Not a Real Problem, VERGE
(Mar. 5, 2019, 12:25 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2019/3/5/18251736/deepfakepropaganda-misinformation-troll-video-hoax; Hayley Duquette, Note, Digital Fame:
Amending the Right of Publicity to Combat Advances in Face-Swapping Technology, 20 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 82, 103 (2020).
24.
Duquette, supra note 24 at 103; see also David Dorfman, Decoding
Deepfakes: How Do Lawyers Adapt When Seeing Isn’t Always Believing?, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
Apr. 2020, at 18, 20.
25.
Duquette, supra note 24, at 103; Dorfman, supra note 24, at 20.
26.
See discussion infra Parts I–III.
27.
See discussion infra Part II.
28.
See discussion infra Part III.
29.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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advocating for the adoption of an amended regulatory scheme via Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act30 and for the re-appropriation of
deepfake technology until such time that federal legislation better promotes
and protects the online privacy and personal safety of members of the
LGBTQ+ community.31
II.

DEEP DIVING INTO DEEPFAKES

Audiovisual manipulation is by no means a novel concept; however,
the newest stage in its evolutionary journey incorporates an added layer of
technological advancements that makes its existence not only more
widespread, but also more intricate.32 In order to develop a better sense of the
threats that deepfakes pose and the manners in which deepfakes may be
mitigated, it is important to understand exactly where deepfakes came from,
how they are made, and why their availability is growing.33
A.

Remember to Rewind

Society’s understanding of deepfakes has become popularized at a
time when “fake news”—or, as some define it, false, inaccurate, or misleading
information designed, presented, and promoted to further interests—is front
and center.34 It is important to note that fake news serves as an umbrella term
under which misinformation and disinformation exist35—misinformation
being the unintentional furtherance of misleading or inaccurate information
and disinformation being its intentional equivalent.36 While the root of these
concepts are ancient, social media structures and the rise of deepfakes have
helped these concepts branch out into a post-truth society where “objective
30.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1997)).
31.
See discussion infra Part V.
32.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 884–85.
33.
Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit One of the
Oldest Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 342 (2019); Westerlund, supra note 19, at 40;
Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2074.
34.
See Cristian Vaccari & Andrew Chadwick, Deepfakes and Disinformation:
Exploring the Impact of Synthetic Political Video on Deception, Uncertainty, and Trust in News,
SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, Jan.–Mar. 2020, at 1, 2.
35.
Fernando Nuñez, Note, Disinformation Legislation and Freedom of
Expression, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 783, 785–86 (2020).
36.
Kyle Anderson, Note, Truth, Lies, and Likes: Why Human Nature Makes
Online Misinformation a Serious Threat (and What We Can Do About It), 44 LAW & PSYCH.
REV. 209, 211 (2019–2020).
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facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and
personal belief.”37
Recent events have highlighted the manners in which all of these
concepts intersect.38 However, these concepts are the latest iteration of a
longstanding practice.39
For example, the earliest known surviving
photograph was taken in the mid-to-late 1820s.40 Since then, the practice of
photo editing has been almost as long-standing as the history of the photograph
itself.41 Although photo editing became a developed practice long before the
creation of the first computer, the emergence of photoshop in the 1980s
allowed for the practice to popularize among both professionals and amateurs
alike.42 The twentieth century saw a similar pattern occur in film—like the
development of the world’s first editing machine in the 1920s—the
development of the videotape recorder in the 1950s, and the introduction of
non-linear editing with the help of modern computers.43
Advancements in the ability to manipulate all of these forms of media,
in one way or another, could produce hundreds of takes and seamlessly string
them together into one desired output that, as far as the consumer of the media
knows, occurred in one attempt.44 These edits of audiovisual footage without
the use of machine learning are known as “cheapfakes,” or “shallowfakes,”
the most common of which include photoshopped images, recontextualized
media, and sped up or slowed down video.45 As technology advanced and
computers began running more intricate programs, the practice of physically
splicing reels of film fell out of practice, and the adoption of more cuttingedge techniques like computer-generated imagery (“CGI”) became the norm.46
Today, deepfake technology has brought society face-to-face with the
latest version of the tried-and-true practices of its predecessors.47 One of the
37.
Hall, supra note 4, at 54.
38.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2073.
39.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 884–85.
40.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 341.
41.
See Michael Scott Henderson, Note, Applying Tort Law to Fabricated
Digital Content, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2018).
42.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 341.
43.
Henderson, supra note 41, at 1149.
44.
See PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 14–15 (explaining that consumer
software and free mobile apps allow for this manipulation).
45.
Id. at 5–6.
46.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2074; Marie-Helen Maras &
Alex Alexandrou, Determining Authenticity of Video Evidence in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and in the Wake of Deepfake Videos, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 255, 256
(2019); David Song, A Short History of Deepfakes, MEDIUM (Sept. 23, 2019),
http://www.medium.com/@songda/a-short-history-of-deepfakes-604ac7be6016.
47.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2074.
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more notable uses of deepfake technology and synthetic media is its use by the
Dalí Museum to “resurrect,” or rather, “reincarnate” Salvador Dalí for a more
immersive, interactive guest experience that the museum’s website describes
as allowing “visitors an opportunity to learn more about Salvador Dalí’s life
from the person who knew him best: the artist himself.”48 But the technology
is not limited only to living things.49 For example, whereas the Dalí Museum
in St. Petersburg, Florida, uses deepfakes to reproduce Salvador Dalí himself,
Russian researchers have used similar software to animate intimate subjects
that include the works of other great artists, such as Johannes Vermeer’s Girl
with a Pearl Earring, and Leonardo DaVinci’s Mona Lisa, as depicted
below.50

Image of Works of Art Animated with Deepfake Technology51
Much like copies of the works produced by some of art’s great
masters, deepfakes have been described as forgeries of photos, videos, and
audios made with the assistance of artificial intelligence.52 In many ways,
referring to deepfakes as forgeries is a misnomer of sorts in that, at least in the
colloquial sense, forgeries are almost exact copies of works already in
existence.53 Deepfakes, on the other hand, operate more as a hyper-realistic
collage in that they synthesize a wide number of already existing works to

48.
Dalí Lives (Via Artificial Intelligence), SALVADOR DALÍ MUSEUM,
http://www.thedali.org/exhibit/dali-lives/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
49.
See Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Deepfakes: More Frightening Than Photoshop
on Steroids, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2019, at 35, 36.
50.
Id.
51.
Gregory Barber, Deepfakes Are Getting Better, but They’re Still Easy to
Spot, WIRED (May 26, 2019, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/story/deepfakes-getting-bettertheyre-easy-spot/.
52.
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 19, at 1.
53.
Forgery,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/forgery (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
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create an entirely new product that looks seamless and real.54 Deepfakes fall
under the larger umbrella of audiovisual manipulation, which is generally
identified as the means for influencing the interpretation of media.55
Audiovisual manipulation splits into two branches: either deepfakes, which
incorporate artificial intelligence, or cheapfakes, which, as mentioned before,
employ less technologically-advanced techniques.56 Cheapfakes require that
individuals upload media onto a computer and manually make adjustments—
a process that, although still yielding a realistic product, can be incredibly
labor-intensive and time-consuming, given its less technical nature.57
However, the introduction of artificial intelligence, described in more detail
below, provides a solution that cuts down on the time, as well as the amount
of manual work needed to create a convincing product.58
It is important to note that “artificial intelligence” is often
synonymized with “machine learning,” however, the two terms are distinct.59
Artificial intelligence is modeled after the human brain and reacts to incoming
data, rather than relying on programmed rules, in order to operate rationally
and intelligently.60 To do this, artificial intelligence incorporates both
algorithms—instructions or sets of instructions—and machine learning.61
Machine learning is a branch of artificial intelligence that resembles the human
trial and error process by allowing computer systems to learn directly from
observing examples, data, and experiences.62
Deepfakes are created with a similar process that incorporates “deep
learning,” a deep neural network that takes in a multitude of data from an input
layer and autonomously runs it through various nodes until it produces an
output layer.63 Oftentimes, this is done either with an autoencoder, which is
an artificial neural network trained to reconstruct inputs from a simpler
representation, or with a Generative Adversarial Network (“GAN”).64 GANs
54.
KELLEY M. SAYLER & LAURIE A. HARRIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11333,
DEEP
FAKES
AND
NATIONAL
SECURITY
(2021),
http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11333.
55.
PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 5–6.
56.
Id.
57.
Jessica Ice, Note, Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First
Amendment, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2019).
58.
Id. at 421.
59.
Herbert B. Dixon Jr., What Judges and Lawyers Should Understand About
Artificial Intelligence Technology, JUDGES J., Winter 2020, at 36, 36 (2020).
60.
Maras & Alexandrou, supra note 46, at 256.
61.
Dixon, supra note 59, at 36.
62.
Maras & Alexandrou, supra note 46, at 256.
63.
Ice, supra note 57, at 421.
64.
Id. at 421–22.
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the subject as it, but moves it in accordance with the movements of another
individual.74 Voice synthesis techniques follow a similar pattern where the
product will either mimic an audio recording and use it to create a video that
matches up perfectly to the sound, or use a small clip of audio to then dictate
any form of speech that is read in the voice of the subject.75
B.

Spreading like Wildfire

In today’s techno-feudalistic society—the technology creators are the
sovereign, its regulators are the nobility, its owners are the vassals, and its
users are the peasants.76 While the internet has provided history with a new
dimension, it has also amplified previously restrictive notions of
accessibility.77 This has not only led to the democratization of technology, but
also to the potential for harm that it brings.78 In this techno-feudalistic world,
although the simplicity with which technology has allowed deepfakes to be
made is a concerning thought, one of the more troubling traits of deepfake
technology is its recent and continued attainability.79 After all,
Modern technology has not only provided new,
convincing, false content, it has also facilitated its dissemination.
Social media platforms have made sharing content faster than ever
by the retweeting, sharing, or reposting mechanisms they have
implemented. This may not be a problem on its own, but recent
research suggests that not all content spreads at the same rate.
Research from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
suggests that false content spreads up to six times faster than factual
content on social media sites and false news stories are seventy
percent more likely to be shared.80

74.
Id.; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 19.
75.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 352.
76.
Alex Hagan, Comment to Future of Work: What Is "Techno-Feudalism"?,
QUORA (July 6, 2015, 1:37 AM), http://www.quora.com/Future-of-Work-What-is-technofeudalism.
77.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of L., Univ. Cal. Berkley Sch. L., Fake News,
Weaponized Defamation and the First Amendment, Keynote Address at Southwestern Law
School (Jan. 26, 2012), in 47 SW. L. REV. 291, 291.
78.
Id.; Nuñez, supra note 35, at 786, 788.
79.
Katarina Kertysova, Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation: How AI
Changes the Way Disinformation is Produced, Disseminated, and Can Be Countered, 29 SEC.
& HUM. RTS. 55, 63–64, 67 (2018).
80.
Nuñez, supra note 35, at 786.
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Importantly, the hurdles on the path to mastering the creation and
dissemination of deepfake media are not the technical skills required to create
deepfakes, per se, but rather the attainability of processors with sufficient
capacity to run large programs.81 Because GANs make outputs a product of
inputs, the greater its data training set, the easier it is for the program to
develop a credible piece of deepfake media.82 This requires that a creator
obtain a graphic processing unit (“GPU”) sizeable enough, and with a vast
amount of memory, to work through the large quantities of photos, videos, or
audios of the target.83 More specifically, to perform deep learning, train a
neural network to reconstruct patterns effectively, and ultimately create
deepfake media, one would need a GPU greater than those found in
commercially available laptops (at least as of 2019), and would require an
understanding of “torrenting, path configuration, file structures, and
application versioning.”84
In reality, to create an effective deepfake, a user need only a computer
comparable to a high-quality gaming laptop that retails for well under
$3,000—a far smaller technological obstacle for gamers and avid computer
hobbyists.85 In fact, even that may not be entirely necessary, as anyone with
basic computer skills has the means by which to create deepfakes.86 What
makes this heightened accessibility of creative processes possible is the rise of
more readily available software in the open market and internet tutorials on
the deepfake-media-making process that, together, work to lift technological
constraints.87 For example, FakeApp is a relatively accessible program that
does not require complex equipment and creates deepfake media in as little as
eight to twelve hours.88
Today, more programs are being cheaply sold, with some of the GPUs
needed to make deepfake media selling for as low as $160 USD.89 For those
that do not have the financial means or interests to purchase, these types of

81.
See Dorfman, supra note 24, at 20; SAYLER & HARRIS, supra note 54.
82.
See J.M. Porup, How and Why Deepfake Videos Work — and What Is at
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GPUs are also available to rent.90 But even absent the necessary GPUs
altogether, most people already have access to programs that can develop
deepfake media.91 Mobile applications like Snapchat, Doublicat, and Reface
are allowing users to make deepfakes right from the palms of their hands.92
This may help explain the growing interest that social media users have in the
use of deepfake technology.93 TikTok—one of the newer social media
platforms circulating in popular culture—has seen its own buzz around
deepfake media with the videos posted by a user very credibly impersonating
actor Tom Cruise with deepfake technology.94 As of the writing of this Article,
that TikTok account, @deeptomcruise, now has over 943,600 followers and
an approximated forty million views across only six videos.95
TikTok does not stand alone, as there are other social media sites with
deepfake capabilities.96 There is a wide field of social media platforms, all of
which have seen a fair share of deepfake media uploads, along with, a vast
body of literature addressing the issue and the factors that aggravate it.97 Deep
Trace, self-described as the world’s first visual threat intelligence company,
identified the existence of at least 14,678 deepfakes circulating online at the
time of its report—a statistic that shows not only the ease with which
deepfakes can be created, but also the simplicity with which social media
platforms disseminate them, or at least play a substantive role in doing so.98
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THE FOE WITH A THOUSAND FACES

There are two sides to every coin, and with the good, there comes
bad.99 Deepfakes first hit the scene on Reddit for a troubling purpose:
Creating synthetic pornography that featured the faces of well-known
celebrities superimposed on existing pornography videos, all without their
knowledge or consent.100 As time went on, this function of deepfake
technology became more and more prevalent, and targeted even those not
operating as public figures in society.101 In fact, research suggests that
deepfake technology seems to be disproportionately impacting women,
whether public figures or private individuals.102 As one Article author put it,
“[t]he harm wrought by [deepfakes] is not simply that a viewer might be
deceived into believing that they are watching a video that actually portrays
the subject (although, that harm may also exist). Rather, it is the dignitary
harm inflicted on the subject herself.”103 Greater still is the disproportionate
impact that deepfakes can have when used to blackmail people within
vulnerable populations, like the LGBTQ+ community, that oftentimes find
themselves hiding in the shadows.104 The concept of data exploitation for the
purposes of blackmailing or harming the LGBTQ+ community is not a new
one, and historical data, in addition to modern concerns over dating apps,
seems to suggest that the threat is magnified for such communities.105
This kind of data exploitation is very much in line with the more
archaic forms of data exploitation that have threatened the LGBTQ+
community throughout various points in history.106 During the height of the
Nazi regime, the Gestapo raided sex research institutions and confiscated
extensive lists containing the names and addresses of local homosexuals.107
Those listed became the targets of the Reich Central Office for the Combatting
of Homosexuality and Abortion.108 The Nazis arrested over 100,000 men as
homosexuals and took some of these men to concentration camps where they
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were denied support groups, experimented on, and murdered.109 Similarly, in
the United States, during the McCarthyist anti-communist campaign of the
mid-1900s, the federal government gathered data on homosexuals through
community member interrogations and raided community safe spaces to
investigate “the alleged employment of homosexuals in the government
service” through a congressional subcommittee created for that particular
purpose.110 Any federal employee suspected of being homosexual was
terminated and outed publicly—exposing hundreds to lost livelihoods,
financial instability, and reduced esteem among their fellow peers and
community members, among many other concerns.111
As technology advanced, more and more LGBTQ+ individuals have
been antagonized by breaches of online privacy and information
exploitation.112 Tragedies like those of Tyler Clementi,113 Channing Smith,114
and many others share that common factor.115 In 2017, LGBTQ+ Chechens
saw the latest iteration of this problem.116 During the last week of February
2017, Chechen officials detained a young man who was suspected of being
under the influence of a controlled substance.117 At the time, Chechen officials
searched the man’s phone without permission and discovered intimate
photographs and messages exchanged with other men which led to the
investigation of his social media platforms.118 The Chechen Officials raided
the man’s private electronic communications and tortured him to compile a
list of other suspected Chechen homosexuals who were then tortured for the
same purpose.119 This sparked the Chechen anti-gay purges, which included
the unofficial detention, humiliation, starvation, and torture of Chechen men
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suspected of being gay.120 While many of these men were returned to their
families, release was often coupled with suggestions that forced
disappearances and honor killings be carried out.121
Although technology has provided, for many in the LGBTQ+
community, access to resources and communities that they once worked
secretly to identify, it has also been shown to serve as the target that many in
society place on the backs of LGBTQ+ members, as well as the key with which
others gain access to them.122 The abuse of the LGBTQ+ community that we
have seen throughout history makes this clear and offers a warning as deepfake
technology begins to circulate more prevalently.123 However, recent events
indicate that we need not engage in extensive thought experiments to identify
the harms that deepfakes can pose to the LGBTQ+ community.124
In 2019, a sex tape was made public of Azmin Ali, the Malaysian
Minister of Economic Affairs, engaging in an intimate relationship with the
male aid of a rival minister.125 Aware that homosexuality is illegal in
Malaysia, Ali and his allies downplayed the tape and its insinuation by
claiming that it was fabricated with deepfake technology and not real.126 Some
digital forensic professionals have yet to find any evidence to suggest that the
footage is a deepfake.127 This circumstance exposes what experts call the
“liar’s dividend,” or when a skeptical public aware of deepfake technology
becomes primed to doubt the authenticity of real audio and video evidence.128
Putting aside questions as to the veracity of the footage, the Ali controversy
serves as a reminder that many members of the LGBTQ+ community still live
in locations where the exposure of their sexual and gender identity can deny
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them opportunities, employment, liberty, and even life.129 However, whether
the Ali video is ultimately identified as real or a deepfake is irrelevant in this
discussion as the possibility alone highlights the reality that many in the
LGBTQ+ community might soon face.130 Even if no scandalous footage
exists, any maliciously-intentioned individual could create a deepfake of a
target that depicts them engaging in homosexual acts, and use it either to have
them denied opportunities altogether or have them extorted for their own
purposes.131
IV.

STOP, DROP, OR ROLL WITH IT

While numerous scholars, technologists, and government
representatives have advocated for the development of new policy initiatives
to specifically address the growing concern surrounding deepfake media and
its implications, this Article focuses more squarely on the adaptation of current
laws in order to provide recourse to those harmed by deepfake media, and on
the legislative efforts that can be taken to secure the privacy and safety of
members of the LGBTQ+ community in light of the potential for that content’s
misuse.132
A.

The Regulation Race

With the public’s understanding of deepfake technology continuing to
grow, and its concerns for its misuse growing with it, one question has become
more prevalent among many others—if technology created the problem,
shouldn’t technology be the thing to offer the solution?133 In 2020, Congress
passed the first deepfake-specific statute—not one addressing any regulatory
structure, but rather one incentivizing research into the development of
deepfake detection software similar to the one depicted below that uses a blue
box to track head rotation, red dots to map facial expressions, and green beams
to detect the direction of eye movement.134
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accountability is not without its difficulties.143 For example, it is likely that an
outright ban of deepfake media would survive constitutional muster under the
First Amendment.144
Additionally, one of the more challenging obstacles that deepfakes
present to those that wish to challenge them in the civil arena is the fact that
finding their creators is very difficult given that the metadata needed to
determine a deepfake’s provenance may be inadequate for proper
identification of its creator.145
Moreover, although deepfake media
necessitates the exploitation of copyrighted material for its development, a
would-be challenger would still have to take on the herculean task of locating
the large quantities of input media, sifting through all of the inputs to
determine if they have rights in any one, or a few, of the materials used and, if
so, still overcome arguments of fair use and transformative use.146 By that
same token, even if the creator of a deepfake is identified, given the
geographically diverse nature of the internet, it may be likely that a deepfake
creator is domiciled outside of the United States making the exercise of
jurisdiction over the creator yet another difficult hurdle to overcome.147 And
of course, civil suits often come at a high cost to both the plaintiff’s financial
interests as well as to their regard in the public eye, ultimately introducing the
possibility of exacerbating their harms.148 While overcoming these initial road
bumps is not impossible, the current legal landscape seems to be a difficult
one under which a would-be plaintiff could find the solution they seek.149
However, that is not to say that there may not be an effective path forward.150
B.

Hope on the Horizon: Amending and Modifying Section 230

Much of what makes deepfakes so harmful is not just the content
itself, but also its ability to spread so rapidly on social media platforms.151
However, what makes the latter of those two issues possible is not so much
the product of the deepfakes themselves as it is the platforms that house them
and the laws used to regulate them.152 The most relevant among them is the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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Id.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2086.
See id.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 15, at 1768.
Id. at 1795.

2022]

DEEPFAKES AND THE LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY

269

Communications Decency Act,153 a federal law passed by Congress in 1996—
particularly, Section 230 of the Act.154 Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act states in pertinent part:
(c)

Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening
of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).155

Prior to the enactment of Section 230, websites that sought to
moderate harmful or offensive material posted by third parties were treated as
publishers and would be held liable if they were unsuccessful in removing the
harmful material.156 However, this presented an interesting loophole as it
allowed for websites to stick their heads in the sand, so to speak, and evade
the imposition of liability by ignoring any harmful content that they knew

153.
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existed on their platform.157 This was seen in action in 1994 when an
individual accused Stratton Oakmont of fraudulent and illegal securities
trading practices on Money Talk, a message board run by Prodigy
Communication Corporation—a leading Internet Service Provider at the
time.158 Stratton responded by suing both Prodigy and Money Talk’s
administrator for libel.159 The court concluded that Prodigy was a publisher
because it held itself out to the public as controlling the content of its computer
bulletin boards and practiced such control through its use of an automatic
software screening program.160 Following the ruling in the Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,161 Congress members grew concerned that the
court’s ruling would disincentivize the moderation of offensive content posted
to internet service providers by third parties.162 As a result, Congress passed
the Communications Decency Act and included in it, Section 230, which
offers internet service providers a broad shield of immunity from liability for
moderating too much or too little of their third party users’ speech.163
However, the absence of narrow language in Section 230’s immunity
clauses has come to be interpreted in a manner that is so broad that it has
created yet another problem—immunity remains available even if an internet
service provider intentionally encourages the posting of harmful content.164 In
fact, when it has been applied, this expansive immunity has allowed internet
service providers to republish content with the knowledge that it violates the
law, alter their platform to prevent the capture of criminals, and allow the sale
of illegal or dangerous products.165 For example, Grindr, a dating app
marketed primarily to the gay community, often sees fake profiles on its
platform wherein a user appropriates the images, whether more commonplace
or intimate, of another (“catfishing”).166 Recently, one of Grindr’s users,
Matthew Herrick, sued the company for the negligent design of its application
after Herrick’s ex-boyfriend began impersonating him on the app by creating
a fake profile in his name, spreading his nude photographs, and sharing rape
157.
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158.
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159.
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fantasies with other users, among many other things.167 Herrick notified
Grindr of his ex-boyfriend’s behaviors over one hundred times to no avail.168
At one point, Herrick’s ex-boyfriend shared Herrick’s address publicly on the
app, which led to over twenty strangers coming to his apartment on any given
day, totaling more than a thousand trespassers.169 The court dismissed
Herrick’s suit against Grindr on the grounds of Section 230 immunity, noting
that his claims were all based on content provided by another Grindr user, not
by Grindr itself, and that to the extent that Grindr had contributed to the
profiles impersonating Herrick, it was only through “neutral assistance,” for
which Section 230 has been interpreted to provide immunity.170 The ruling
was later affirmed on appeal.171
Looking more directly at the role of Section 230 in the perpetuation
of the threats that deepfake technologies present particularly to the LGBTQ+
community, the facts of Herrick v. Grindr, LLC172 can be adapted to illustrate
the point in action.173 User A of a social media platform either creates or
obtains a deepfake that impersonates User B, and depicts B in some intimate
act without their knowledge or consent.174 User A uploads the harmful or
offensive deepfake to a social media platform, where the content spreads and
gets shared.175 Upon discovery of the deepfake content, B requests that the
platform remove it on account of the professional, reputational and
psychological harm that the synthetic media creates.176 The platform never
removes the content, it continues to spread and harm B, and B sues the
platform.177 Under the current framework of Section 230, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the adapted facts would yield a conclusion
different than the one in Herrick, despite the platform’s actual knowledge of
the harmful or offensive nature of the content in question and of the damage
that it causes.178 Herein lies the heart of the problem, worse even, when the
167.
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168.
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facts are adapted once more so that B is a closeted LGBTQ+ community
member whom A exploits and extorts financially or professionally on social
media platforms through the use of the deepfake media.179 The risks seem
endless and could even magnify to implicate national security.180
As it stands now, Section 230 provides nearly no incentive for social
media platforms to monitor and moderate the content on their interfaces, even
in the face of actual knowledge of their harmful and offensive nature.181
However, growing calls to amend Section 230 could provide a solution that
not only opens the door to the imposition of liability on account of deepfake
media perpetuation, but also more broadly offers recourse for those harmed by
it.182 After all, amendments to Section 230’s immunity clauses are not a
foreign or far away idea.183 Only three years prior to the time of this writing,
Section 230’s text was amended by the passage of the Allow States and
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”).184 More
recently, legislators on both sides of the aisle—like current Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, Senators Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley, and even a former
White House technology advisor—have all suggested repealing or amending
Section 230.185 There is merit in Section 230’s interest in fostering free
speech, and making a blanket repeal could be costly with regard to social
discourse; however, modification presents an appealing solution that allows
for the maintenance of both the free speech and privacy protection interests.186
As Jon M. Garon, Professor and former Dean at Nova Southeastern
University’s Shepard Broad College of Law, has noted, there are two ways in
which Section 230 can be modified to strike a more equitable balance between
the two interests.187
First, once content has been determined by a court to be libelous or
harassing, the [Internet Service Provider] should have an obligation
to remove that content immediately upon notification. Second, if an
[Internet Service Provider] refuses to remove content someone
179.
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believes to be defamatory or an invasion of privacy, that person
should be permitted to go to court to have the content removed. If
a court determines the speech is harmful, then the [Internet Service
Provider] should be obligated to take down or block the speech.
That order would then apply to other [Internet Service Providers] as
well.188

A similar proposed modification has been offered by Danielle Citron
and Benjamin Wittes—both leading voices in the area of deepfake technology
and its proposed regulation—that conditions immunity on reasonable content
moderation practices 189 As suggested by Citron and Wittes, the proposed
amendment to Section 230(c)(1) would read:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service that
takes reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its
services shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider in
any action arising out of the publication of content provided by that
information content provider.190

Although there is no simple legislative solution to specifically address
the complications that deepfakes present, there is no shortage of reasonable
amendments to Section 230’s existing language that could remedy the present
situation.191 Amending Section 230 to at least allow individuals threatened by
the posting of deepfake media to more fairly challenge its presence, not only
establishes recourse where there currently seems to be none, but also shelters
individuals, like those in the LGBTQ+ community, whose privacy and safety
are at a heightened risk of exploitation and extortion.192
C.
Embracing our New Reality: The LGBTQ+ Community’s Information
Anonymization Efforts with Deepfake Technology
The LGBTQ+ community has long been a champion of
reappropriating the tools of its oppressors for purposes of finding
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empowerment and freedom.193 For a community in which the pendulum
between its two driving values—visibility and privacy—swings quickly from
one side to the other, it comes as no surprise that some of its members have
now embraced deepfake technology.194 Despite deepfakes posing potential
privacy and safety threats, members of the LGBTQ+ community have been
quick to get in front of deepfake technology and adopt it for anonymization
and privacy protection purposes.195 As of the time of this writing, the most
notable use of such a tactic was by the creators of Welcome to Chechnya, a
documentary exposing the realities of the victims of the Chechen anti-gay
purges that uses deepfake technology to mask and protect the identities of the
victims and informants featured in the film.196
Visual effects expert Ryan Laney described Welcome to Chechnya’s
technological endeavor as “a digital prosthetic where 100[%] of the motion,
the emotion, and the essence of what the subject is doing is there.”197 In order
for the documentary’s visual effects team to develop this advanced form of
anonymization, individuals volunteered a personal image and consented to its
application on the content of the film’s subjects, ultimately resulting in a sort
of digital marionette puppet.198 Two things make this process different than
the ones in which other deepfakes are usually seen.199 First, the deepfakes
were created with the consent of both the subject—the person on which the
altered image is placed, or, in other words, the person anonymized—and the
target—the person whose image is being transposed on the subject, or, in other
words, the anonymizer.200 Second, the purpose of such a deepfake is to
safeguard the interest of the subject rather than to exploit it.201
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Image of Deepfake Technology used to Disguise Source Featured in
Welcome to Chechnya202
Welcome to Chechnya has reappropriated technology that is
potentially dangerous to members of the LGBTQ+ community around the
world and turned that sword, and its threat, into the shield behind which they
can find privacy and protection.203 In fact, this may already be a growing trend
that members of the LGBTQ+ community can jump on board with.204 Laney
and other startups such as D-ID and Alethea AI have begun to take an interest
in developing entities that facilitate and democratize the creation of “digital
veils” to cloak individuals in danger.205 Until legislation is created or amended
to better protect against the threats that deepfake technology could pose to
individuals like those in the LGBTQ+ community, the adoption of these
“digital veil” programs could not only help to bring about peace of mind,
security of liberty, and protection of life to members of the LGBTQ+
community.206 It could also introduce them to the next evolutionary chapter
in its long history of adaptation and self-preservation.207
V.

CONCLUSION

As society ventures into a new world where technology develops at
an evolutionary rate faster than usual, society must remain mindful, in addition
to being cautious, not only of the many implications that advancements have
on the technical aspect of our society but also on the social implications that
may arise as the natural byproduct.208 While deepfakes present the newest, in
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a long history, of audiovisual manipulations, a closer look at society’s
response to deepfake technology through an equally evolutionary perspective
is necessary.209 The most effective manner of doing this is in the same way
that we have for all other challenges that we face in our day-to-day lives: with
the guidance of the law, whose essential function is to provide recourse where
individuals are harmed, to carve out a path to such an outcome where there
does not exist such a form of redress, and to disincentivize malicious
wrongdoers from their misdeeds.210
Society must remain hopeful that experts, scholars, technologists, and
legislators will move to introduce specific policies that help society counteract
the potentially negative implications that deepfake technology may present.211
However, until a one-size-fits-all policy is adopted, it is necessary to adapt
existing regulatory frameworks like Section 230 so as to effectively face
deepfakes’ problems as they come and protect the interests of those
communities like the LGBTQ+ community that remain vulnerable to them.212
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